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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a Decree of Abandonment and
order denying the Appellant's Motion to Amend Findings and
Judgment or in the Alternative for a New Trial.

DISPOSITION OF CASE
BY LOWER COURT
Judgnent was entered on February 22, 1980, in favor
of Respondents on the abandonment issue joined in the pleadings.
Appellant moved to amend the findings, conclusions and decree or,
alternatively, to open the judgment for the taking of additional
testimony, or for a new trial.
following grounds:

The motion was based upon the

(1) the absence of findings regarding the

credibility of Appellant and his witnesses;

(2) Appellant's

inability to present certain testimonial evidence at trial; and
(3) the insufficiency of the evidence to justify the decision.
Oral argument on the motion was heard by the trial court, and
its order denying the same was entered, on April 16, 1980.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have this Court substitute its
discretion and view of the testimonial record for that of the
trial court, or in the alternative, to remand the case for
further evidentiary proceedings to permit Appellant to more fully
develop and present his case.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's statement of facts consists principally of
allegations and conclusions unsupported by the record, and fails
the requirement of the appellate rules of this Court, i.e., that
the substantial facts supporting the ruling of the trial court
must be fully and fairly set forth.

Accordingly, Respondents

find it necessary to make an accurate and complete statement of
material facts.

The Trial
Following her divorce from Appellant in January

1970,

(R. 7 and Ex. P-1), Respondent Nadine McKinstray Suesserman and
her two children, Melody and Peter, resided with her parents,
the McGuires, in Jackson, Wyoming (R. 61).

The McKinstray and

McGuire families had been residents of the small town of Jackson
for many years, 37 and 20 years respectively (R. 64, 177).

The

two families' homes were only one-half mile apart in the same
residential section of town (R.

70) ; Nadine and Appellant had

attended high school together (R. 69); and, the families were
well known to each other (R. 72).

Except for the brief period

between late December, 1972, and February, 1973, while they
accompanied their mother on a trip to Ontario, California, the
children resided continuously at the McGuire home until September,
1973, at which time Nadine moved with them to Denver, Colorado

(R. 62, 73).
Prior to his last contact with the children near Easter
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,
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1973, Appellant had always arranged visitations by telephoning
the McGuire home (R. 63).

Communicating with his ex-wife was

difficult, but he was on speaking terms with her mother (R. 213)
and was never denied the right to visit with the children (R. 330).
Appellant remarried in October

1971; his second wife recalled

his experiencing no difficulty having visitation (R. 162).

The

McKinstray grandparents also visited with Melody and Peter, usually
on their birthdays

(R. 92).

After 1970, Appellant's child support payments were
made with increasing irregularity, and by late September
he was almost eleven months in arrears

(Ex. R-2).

1972,

The arrearage

situation precipitated visitation problems which strained relations
between the two families to the point that Mrs. McGuire and Mrs.
McKinstray argued in November

1972 (R. 186, 187).

Mrs. McKinstray,

having "made up her mind", never visited with the children again
(R. 188).

She did, however, engage her son's divorce counsel in

early 1973 to obtain Nadine's Ontario; California, address via
the Teton County court clerk's office for the ostensible purpose
of forwarding the children's late Christmas presents and a
February birthday gift for Melody (R. 181;

Ex~

R-4, R-5 and R-12).

Counsel's letter to Nadine addressed to her parents' post office
box number (Ex. R-5), an address she had used ever since the
divorce and continued to use as a forwarding address until her
parents moved from Jackson in 1978 (R. 91), reached her in due
course

and she supplied her California address without hesitance

(R. 82).

The presents were not mailed, however, and although
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Nadine, Melody and Peter moved back to the McGuires' home in
Jackson shortly thereafter -- which Mrs. McKinstray knew (R. 189)
-- the presents were never delivered (R. 179; Ex. R-15, R-16,
R-17 and R-18).
After Nadine moved back to Jackson from California,
she could not agree on visitation terms with Appellant, so he
determined to visit the children at their elementary school
(R. 214-216).

That school visit, near Easter

1973, was the

last contact or communication Appellant ever had with his children (R. 75, 91 and 216).

Likewise, he made no child support

payments after April 23, 1973 (Ex. R-2).
Easter

1973, visit

he felt ".

.

Appellant stated to his wife regarding what

. for not having his kids" that

want any more kids.
more.

Sometime after that

it

•

he didn •· t

He didntt want to go through this pain any

He just didn't want no part of it".

(R. 171).

Appellant

made no further requests to visit with the children during the
summer of 1973, and Nadine moved with them to Denver, Colorado
in September of that year (R. 68).

Ten months later, Nadine

and the children moved to St. Louis, Missouri, and then to Salt
Lake City, Utah, in the fall of 1979 (R. 73).
In each of the years 1974 through 1977, Melody and
Peter returned to Jackson to vacation at the McGuire home for the
school summer recess period of June, July and August (R. 73, 74
and 94).

During the same summer months of 1978, the children

were again with the McGuires in their Jackson home and accompanying their grandparents on trips to and from Ennis, Montana, in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the course of their moving to that state (R. 74, 75 and 100).
Some time prior to his last Easter 1973, visit wir_h
Melody and Peter, Appellant had moved to Worland, Wyoming, which
is 200 to 250 miles northeast of Jackson, where he has resided
since (R. 131-134).
Appellant knew that his children were, or had been, in
Jackson on numerous occasions over the five-year period following his final Easter 1973, visit with them (R. 216).

His brother,

Darrell McKinstray, a barber in that town, had seen the children
"three or four times" during the summers from 197 3 to 19 7 8

(R. 153),

most recently in 1978 walking in front of his shop and at the
drugstore (R. 152).

Darrell also had heard from others including

his wife, Candy, that the children were spending summers in
Jackson (R. 153); Candy McKinstray had been told by one of
Nadine's friends that the children were in Jackson (R. 157).
Darrell reported this information to his mother (R. 153).

Mrs.

McKinstray had received word from other Jackson residents as well
--by her own estimate, as many as ten times over the years in
question--that her grandchildren had been in town (R. 189, 200,
203) , and in the course of her usual monthly telephone conversations with Appellant, she relayed that information to her son
(R. 191, 201 and 202).

Not once during the entire period did

Appellant ask his mother, or his brother, to inquire about the
children for him, and his only response to the reports from her
was "Oh 11

,

or "Did you see them? 11

(R. 159, 202 and 208).

Darrell McKinstray had occasion to see his brother
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in Jackson a couple of times a year but didn't mention the children as he knew Appellant didn "t like to
and 158) .

talk

i

about them (R. 157

Even during his customary telephone calls to his mother,

Appellant did not discuss the children with any regularity (R. 202)l
Appellant testified that while on trips to Jackson, other people
asked him if he had seen his children, "that they had seen them
in Jackson"

{R. 216), and that a friend, one Robbins, told him he ,

had seen his children at a Shriners' Circus in town (R. 227-228).
Melody and Peter each testified that they had seen, and
been recognized by, their McKinstray grandparents and their uncles
Darrell McKinstray and Paul McKinstray many times during their
school vacation visits to Jackson over the summers between 1973
and 1978, but that the McKinstrays never spoke to them, never
called to see them or to talk to them at the McGuire home, and
sent no letters, cards, or birthday presents.

Mrs. McGuire's

testimony confirmed that of the children's in this regard {R. 98,
99, 100-101, 107, 111-116, 123-125 and 127-128).

Nadine also was

in the company of the children on some of the summer occasions
when they wer.e seen by Mrs. Mc Kins tray and her son, Darrell (R. 90).
Appellant testified that his only efforts to locate his
children after the last 1973 visit with them had been to ncheck
phone books" in various cities while truck driving (R. 216-217)
and a single inquiry to a Jackson acquaintance, one Olga Nelson.
She had no information to give and reacted with "shock" and
"surprise" that he would ask her instead of the McGuires (R. 218
and 229).

After 1973, and through the summer of 1978, the
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McGuires lived in Jackson at the same address Appellant had known
as their family residence (R. 228).

He knew this and had occasion

to drive by that home with his wife numerous times (R.

17~

and 228).

Until their removal to Montana in 1978, the McGuires' post office
box address and telephone number remained the same that Appellant
had always used to contact Nadine prior to this last 1973 visit
with the children (R. 148).

Appellant testified that he was on

speaking terms with Mrs. McGuire in 1973 (R. 213); nevertheless,
after 1973 he chose not to seek information from the McGuires
concerning the whereabouts of Nadine and the children (R. 98 and
227) assuming " . . . she wouldn't tell me where they were
(R. 221).

"

Mrs. McGuire testified that she would have informed

the McKinstrays of the childrens' summer visits, but "They never
asked"

(R. 104).

Since April

1973, neither Nadine nor Mrs.

McGuire have been contacted by any third person seeking information about the children on Appellant's behalf and no cards, letters
or gifts for the children have been received by either of them
(R. 75-77, 99 and 101).
Appellant's explanations for failing to expend any other
effort than he did to locate and conununicate with his children
after the Easter

1973, visit were as follows:

Three to four

years after the divorce, his counsel advised letting "Nadine
calm down a little moren

(R. 219);

If he didn't pay child support

he" . . . figured in time she [Nadine] would get fed up with it
and she would

she would start something again"

(R. 231); and

nAs time went by I felt that it was better to wait until -- and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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let them [Melody and Peter]

contact me"

(R. 224)

c

Appellant also

rejected further legal proceedings as a means of locating the
children because he "

. . had got fed up with the way lawyers

was handling things and disgusted with the way the Court system
was working"

(R. 227 ) .

Appellant admitted that he has had the ability to pay
the court-ordered child support throughout the years since 1973
(R. 137, 138).

Due to his total lack of contact or communication

with his children since that time, he agrees "There's not much
left" of any relationship between them (R. 224) .
children do not know him (R.

Indeed, his

90) ; neither do they have any love

or affection for him nor parent-child relationship with him (R. 78)

The Post-Judgment Motion
Appellant submitted no affidavits in support of his
motion to open the judgment on the basis of newly-discovered
evidence (R. 238) , and Respondents made timely objection to that
deficiency (R. 239 and 242).

Accordingly, Appellant's gratuitous

recitation in his Statement of Facts of the proposed testimonial
evidence by Shirley Baldwin is without foundation in the record.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
DENYING APPELLANT'S RULE 52 AND
59 MOTION TO TAKE ADDITIONAL
EVIDENCE AND AMEND FINDINGS.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A principle basic to our system of jurisprudence is
that once a litigant has had his day in court and a judgment has
been entered,that judgment is to be final and will not be disturbed unless clear and substantial error is shown.

Burton v.

Zions Co-op Mercantile Institution, 122 Utah 360, 249 P.2d 514 (1953)
With that policy in mind, motions to amend findings and judgments
or to obtain new trials, are not looked upon with favor.

Newbern

v. Exley Produce Express, 303 P.2d 231, 235 (Ore. 1956).
The criteria for granting a motion for further evidentiary
proceedings to amend findings upon the basis of newly-discovered
evidence has been codified in Rule 59(a) (4) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure:
Newly discovered evidence, material for
the party making the application, which he
could not, with reasonable diligence, have
discovered and produced at the trial.
The trial court is permitted wide discretion in ruling
on such motions, and this Court will not disturb those rulings
unless it is manifestly clear that the lower court abused its
discretion or that a miscarriage of justice has occurred.

Uptown

Appliance & Radio Co. v. Flint, 249 P.2d 826 (Utah 1952).

However,

a predicate to the existence of such discretion in the trial court
to grant a motion such as the one made by Appellant is the showing
of the requisite statutory grounds.

Tangaro v. Marrero, 13 Utah

2d 290, 373 P.2d 390 (1962).
The Appellant submitted no affidavits in support of his
Rule 52 and 59 motion to take newly-discovered evidence as mandated by Rule 59(c), U.R.C.P.

(R. 238), and Respondents made
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timely objection to that statutory deficiency (R. 239 and 242).
Such affidavits must set out both the proposed testimony and the
specific circumstances of the movant's efforts to discover and
produce that evidence prior to trial.

Sabin v. Rauch, 255 P.2d

206 (Ariz. 1952); Fusselman v. Yellowstone Valley Land & Irrigation
Co., 163 P. 473 (Montana 1917).

Accordingly, the trial court was

invested with no discretion in this matter in the first instance,
and Appellant's representations that the trial court did not
require the submission of affidavits is not supported by the
record.
Assuming arguendo that the trial court had the discretion
to consider Appellant's post-judgment motion to hear the "Shirley
Baldwin" evidence in the absence of the requisite factual showing,
it did not abuse that discretion in denying to open the judgment
for the reason that Appellant failed to demonstrate either (1) that
he had exercised due diligence or (2) that the evidence was so
substantially material that in all likelihood the court's judgment,
would have been different.

Universal Ins. Co. v. Carpets Inc.,

First, Appellant's witnesses knew of Shirley Baldwin
(R. 104, 160 and 12 7) .

Appellant failed to particularize his

pre-trial efforts to locate that witness, and we have only his
conclusory, self-serving statements that diligent attempts were
made to locate her and that only after trial was she found by
telephoning her residence in Arizona (R. 240).

'
t

16 Utah 2d 336, 400 P.2d 564 (1965).

It is held that
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1

where it appears that the degree of activity or inquiry which led
to the discovery of a witness or evidence after tial would have
produced the same evidence had it been exercised prior thereto,
due diligence has not been exercised.

In re Here's Estate, 19

N.W. 2d 893 (Minn. 1945); 58 AmJur 2d, New Trial, §169, pp. 381-382.
Apparently, all that was required of Appellant to locate Shirley
Baldwin was a more earnest telephone search.

That being the case,

he did not exercise the requisite pre-trial diligence.
Second, the proffered testimonial evidence does not
suggest the reasonable likelihood of a different result at trial.
Appellant's counsel candidly admitted at the hearing on his postjudgment motion that the pivotal issue in the case was whether Mr.
McKinstray made sufficient efforts over the years in question to
locate his children.

By his own admissions, he made only token

efforts (R. 216-218 and 229), and the court so found.

In light of

those damaging admissions any conversations Nadine may have had
with Shirley Baldwin--even if they evidenced Nadine's desire that
Appellant never visit the children--would not have effected the
trial court's view of the evidence and ruling that his failure to
communicate with the children was without good cause or justification.
Appellant's Rule 52 and 59 motion was properly denied.
POINT II
APPELLANT HAS NOT BEEN DENIED DUE
PROCESS OR EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW.
Appellant concedes that Point II of his argument is
"

. . a novel one which

. may be without merit."

Respondents

agree that it is without merit.
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1.

Findings regarding credibility of witnesses
are not necessary.

This Court has held that findings of a trial court
sitting without jury should be limited to the ultimate facts to
be determined, and that they are none the less findings of fact
because they are drawn as conclusions from other intermediate
facts.

Jankele v. Texas Co., 88 Utah 325, 54 P.2d 425

(1936).

If the findings follow the allegations of the pleadings, even
though they are general and limited to the ultimate facts, they
are sufficient to support the judgment.

Pearson v. Pearson, 561

P.2d 1080 (Utah 1977).
The trial court's Findings of Fact (R. 35-37) set out
the essential facts upon which its decree is based, including
Appellant's ability and failure to pay support over a long period,
his failure to communicate or maintain a parental relationship
with his children as a result of minimal or token effort to do so
without good cause or justification and his manifestation of an
intent to abandon them.

The trial court had to resolve in its

own mind many intermediate facts to arrive at these ultimate ones.
Even

tho~gh

J
\

the court chose not to delineate those many subordinaci

facts, its announced findings are no less valid or sufficient.
Respondents are aware of no requirement that a trial
courtts written findings include findings regarding the
of witnesses.

credibili~

The process of resolving issues of fact obviously

includes an analysis of the weight to be given contradictory evi- ~
dence, the view to be taken of any given evidence in the light oft
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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other evidence and a consideration of the believability of the
witnesses presenting the evidence.
to be resolved and found as fact;

"Credibility'' is not an issue
rather, it is an intangible

element to be applied by the fact-finder in the process of deciding
which facts exist.

The trial court's determination of which

witnesses were believable and which witnesses were not are
implicit in its findings of ultimate facts.
2.

This Court's review standards are not inconsistent
with trial standards of proof.

The standard of review applied by this Court to rulings
on plenary hearings in equity cases is simply stated:

unless the

evidence is clearly insufficient to sustain the findings, or the
findings are demonstrated to be manifestly against the weight of
the evidence, they will not be disturbed.

Peterson v. Peterson,

190 P.2d 135 (Utah 1948); Shaw v. Jeppson, 239 P.2d 745 (Utah 1952).
This appellate standard is applied irrespective of whether the
burden of proof at trial was that necessary to persuade the trier
of fact by a "preponderance of the evidence" or by "clear and
convincing evidence".

McMahon v. Tanner, 249 P.2d 502 (Utah 1952);

Peterson, supra.
The subtlety of Appellant's suggestion that he has been
denied due process and equal protection of the law as a result of
this Court's failure to apply a more strict standard of review to
cases in which the clear and convincing burden of proof applies
escapes Respondents.

Irrespective of the burden of proof at trial,
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the standard is the same on appeal, i.e., the findings will be
upset only if reasonable minds could not differ in deciding to
the contrary.

Robertson v. Hutchinson, 560 P.2d 1110 (Utah 1977) ..

\

The "reasonable mind" standard is the constant yardstick applied
by this Court in determining whether the findings of the trier
of fact are shown by the recorded evidence to be more probable
than not ("preponderance") or to be beyond probability and clinchec
in the mind ("clear and convincing") .

Greener v. Greener, 212 P. 2c

194, 204 (Utah 1949).

POINT III
APPELLANT HAS NO STANDING TO
CHALLENGE THE ·SUFFICIENCY OF THE
EVIDENCE.
At no point in the proceedings below did Appellant move
the court for a directed verdict pursuant to Rule SO(a), U.R.C.P.
Accordingly, he has no standing on appeal to assert the

insuffici~

of the evidence to support the judgment.
The law is to the effect that one who
does not move for a directed verdict generally
has no standing to urge on appeal that the
evidence does not support the judgment. However, an exception exists where plain error
appears in the record and it would result in
a miscarriage of justice to affirm the
judgment.
Henderson v. Meyer, 533 P.2d 290,
2 91-9 2 (Utah 19i
Appellant has not particularized for this Court any "plai
error" in the record which demonstrates a miscarriage of justice.
It is mandatory that a litigant argue that his opponent has not
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established his case as a matter of law via the appropriate motion
to the trial court.

This Appellant did not do.

POINT IV
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT
UNDER THE LAW OF THE CASE.
There is no dispute in this case that Appellant failed
to pay child support for six and one-half years notwithstanding
his ability to do so (R. 137 and 138).

Neither is it disputed

that he failed over the same period of time to maintain a parental
relationship with them.

The crucial issues presented are:

Whether Appellant's lack of communication with his children and
his failure to expend more effort than he did to locate them was
without good cause and whether his conduct evidenced an intention
to abandon them.

The trial court found against Appellant on each

of these issues (R. 36), and those findings are amply supported
by the evidence.
The facts regarding Appellant•s efforts after Easter
1973 to locate his children were not in dispute.

He described

those as being telephone book searches in various cities to which
he traveled as a long-line truck driver and a single inquiry to a
Jackson resident who knew Nadine (R. 216-218 and 229).

The facts

pertaining to Appellant's knowledge that the children had been
with the McGuires in Jackson for many months during the summers
of 1974 through 1978 while disputed, were not categorically denied
or contradicted by him.

Where evidence in an equity case consists
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largely of testimony of witnesses, this Court should defer to,
and rely upon, the trial judge's resolution of conflicts in that
evidence.

Greener, supra.
Respondents cite the recent case of Adoption of Guzman,

586 P.2d 418

(Utah 1978) as the best authority in support of the

trial court's ruling.
a natural mother.

Guzman was an abandonment action against

The evidence was that the mother had failed

to communicate with the children, neither had she sent letters or
gifts or made calls to them, over a four-year period even though
the children, their father and step-mother all resided in the
same county as the mother and their address and telephone number
were listed in the telephone directory.

This Court stated:

During an interval of approximately
four years, appellant Anita appears to have
shown little interest in the children here
involved and her failure to exercise her
rights of visitation and in failing to
cormnunicate or to attempt to communicate
with the children or with her former
husband and father of the children and
his present wife appear sufficient to
support the court's conclusion that she
intended to abandon them.
(Emphasis added)
586 P.2d at 419
While Guzman may be distinguished for the reason that
those parties and the children all resided in the same county
and state, the case is analogous for the reason that a telephone
number and address were available to the non-custodial parent
at which inquiry could be made regarding the children.

Clearly,

the principle urged by Respondents here is recognized in Guzman:
a non-custodial parent's failure without good cause to communicate,
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or attempt to communicate, with his children or show other interest
in them for the period established in this case, six and one-half
years (April 1973 to October 1979), justifies a finding of intent
to abandon.
Appellant McKinstray knew that his children had been in
Jackson on numerous occasions over the years 1974 through 1978.
He also knew that the McGuires continued to reside at the same
address during that period with the same telephone number he had
called many times prior to 1974 to arrange visitation.

Notwith-

standing, he never requested his mother or any other family member
to assist in obtaining information regarding the children's whereabouts, and he consciously failed to avail himself of the most
obvious and ready source of that information in Jackson:

the

McGuires.
Appellant's apologies for not pursuing the information
that would have enabled him to locate his children are legally
indefensible and morally timorous, viz: upon advice of counsel in
1973 or 1974 he decided to "let Nadine calm down a little moren
(R. 219); although he was on speaking terms with Mrs. McGuire, he
did not inquire of her regarding his children•s address because
he assumed" . . . she wouldn't tell me where they were"

(R. 221);

if he didn't pay the court-ordered support he " . . . figured in
time she would get fed up with it and she would--she would start
something again"

(R. 231); and, nas time went by I felt that it

was better to wait until--and let them [Melody and Peter] contact
me"

(R. 224).

He also refused the available remedy afforded by
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the Wyoming divorce court as he was "fed up'' with lawyers and
"disgusteO. with the court system" (R. 227).

Clearly, Appellant's

failure to communicate with his children was the consequence of
his decision not to do so.

He made no good faith attempt to

locate them for no justifiable reason.
The most telling revelation of Appellant's intent,
however, was that given by his own wife who testified that in
1973 or 1974 during a conversation with her about what he felt
. for not having his kids" he said that " . . . he didn't

"

want any more kids.
more.

He didn't want to go through this pain any-

He just didn't want no part of it"

(R. 171).

Appellant's

decision to abandon Melody and Peter was expressed and unequivocal,
and over the six-year period between 1973 and 1979 his conduct
manifested that intent.
Appellant's argument that the best interests of the
children is a proper criterion of proof in an abandonment case
misses the mark.

The law of the case is stated in Adoption of

Maestas, 531 P.2d 492, 494 (Utah 1975) to be that " . . . the
question of the welfare of the child is not material in a judicial
2
determination of abandonment." In both the Robertson 1 and Hall
cases cited by Appellant, the trial court had found no abandonment and each case was affirmed on appeal.

The statements in

those decisions regarding the "welfare of the children" and
"anxieties on both sides" were obiter.

1 Robertson v. Hutchinson, 560 P.2d 1110 (Utah 1977).
2 Hall v. Anderson, 562 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1977).
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The trial court's findings that Appellant failed to
maintain a parental relationship with his children as a consequence
of his having made only token effort to do so, without good cause
or justification, and that he intended to abandon them are amply
supported by the evidence in the record before this Court.

CONCLUSION
This appeal presents the hackneyed case of a discontented
Defendant in an abandonment action who, troubled at being called
to account for his indifference to the welfare and love of his
children, hopes another try will redeem him.

The trial court in

the exercise of its broad discretionary powers denied Appellant's
motion for that second try.

No abuse of discretion in that decision

has been shown.
The judgment of the lower court is convincingly confirmed
by the record.

The statements therein of Appellant and his own

witnesses are the clearest testament to the reality of his desertion of Melody and Peter.

Appellant is not, therefore, entitled

to any relief on this appeal.
submitted,

GARY L. PAXTON
STEWART, YOUNG, PA ON
220 South 200 East, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondents
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CE'RTTFTGATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 8th day of October, 1980,
I personally delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the
foregoing Brief of Respondents to MELVIN G. LAREW, JR., Attorney
for Appellant, 345 South State Street, Suite 200, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84111.

GARY L. PAXTON
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